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Abstract:  
This paper examines the interplay between takeover defenses and shareholder activism. Using a 
comprehensive sample of shareholder activism events between 2006 and 2014, I find a differential 
impact of takeover defense measures on the likelihood of being targeted for activism; a dual-class 
structure or a staggered board deters activism, whereas firms with a poison pill in place are more 
likely to become targets. Activists are more likely to demand removal of takeover defense 
measures and/or sale of the target firm if the firm has a staggered board or a poison pill in place, 
suggesting that when takeover defenses block the market for corporate control, activists promote 
changes through their interventions. I also find that target firms with takeover defenses are more 
likely to remove those defenses and more likely to be acquired following activism, which suggests 
that activism can act as an antidote to takeover defenses. Finally, while many target firms adopt a 
poison pill in response to activist approaches, I do not find evidence that it makes for an effective 
defense.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2842695 
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Takeover Defenses in the Era of Shareholder Activism 
1. Introduction 
 This paper examines the interplay between takeover defense measures and 
shareholder activism. While defense measures have evolved to protect companies from the threat 
of hostile takeovers, they can potentially play an important role in shareholder activism campaigns 
led by hedge funds and other investors. Such campaigns have become a significant phenomenon 
in recent years. While shareholder activists attempt to bring about changes at target firms with 
their significant ownership and specific plans, boards and management often resist activist 
demands and seek to defend their strategies and existing governance mechanisms. In fact, many 
companies now adopt defense measures traditionally used to prevent hostile takeovers as 
protection from hedge fund activists. In this paper, I examine how these defense measures now 
play a role in shaping activism.  
 I focus on three defense mechanisms which are most relevant to shareholder activism: dual-
class shares, staggered boards, and poison pills (Gill et al., 2014; Schulte, Roth, and Zabel, 2014).1 
In a multi-class (mostly dual-class) capital structure,2 insiders can hold shares with majority voting 
power, making it almost impossible for minority shareholders, including activists, to win a proxy 
contest. A staggered board acts to prevent activists from gaining control of a board in a single 
election − historically, no activist or hostile bidder has ever won two consecutive elections (Gill et 
al., 2014). A poison pill is designed to limit activist influence over a firm by preventing the activists 
from acquiring more than a specified percentage of the shares. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 My interviews with legal and strategic advisors involved on the side of both activists and boards suggest that both 
sides consider takeover defenses in the context of their decision to target companies or how to prevent the company 
from being approached by activists, in deciding the tactics during the campaign and in the likelihood of success.  
2 I use the term “dual-class” for all multi-class capital structures.  
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Using a sample of 1,845 publicly disclosed activism events involving hedge fund activists 
and other major shareholders that commenced between 2006 and 2014, I examine the dynamics 
between takeover defenses and shareholder activism by answering the following questions: (1) 
What is the effect of each takeover defense on target selection? (2) What is the effect of takeover 
defenses on activist demands? (3) What is the effect of shareholder activism on a company’s 
existing takeover defenses and takeover probabilities? (4) Do companies adopt a poison pill in 
response to activism and is it an effective defense against activists?  
 The first set of empirical tests examines how the three defense measures—dual-class 
shares, a staggered board, and a poison pill—are associated with activists’ decisions to target 
companies. For activists, target selection is a function of (a) the extent of potential valuation gains 
arising from undervaluation, or opportunities for improvement in the target and (b) the probability 
of successfully bringing about desired changes in the target company. In this context, takeover 
defenses can have two opposing effects on activists’ target selection. On one hand, prior research 
suggests that takeover defense measures are associated with management entrenchment, in itself a 
possible cause of the undervaluation. Activists are likely to consider how much improvement they 
can bring to a firm, and firms with entrenched managers hold the promise of higher returns. 
Activists can also use the presence of takeover defenses as a public relations tool, emphasizing the 
entrenchment of the board and management in order to convince other shareholders to take the 
activists’ side in a proxy fight.  
 On the other hand, defense mechanisms can deter activism by lowering the probability of 
success and increasing the costs for activists. The activists’ expected costs increase if the defense 
mechanisms lower their chances of success, thus reducing their expected returns. Therefore, just 
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as takeover defense measures deter takeover attempts, they can discourage attempts to engage in 
activism campaigns.  
 The effectiveness of the defense mechanisms against activism varies, given that they have 
distinct characteristics. A dual-class structure can block activist influence and a chance to win a 
proxy fight, as management or management-friendly shareholders own the majority of voting 
power in most cases. Since activists are likely to end up in a proxy contest that is practically 
impossible to win, a dual-class structure can provide an effective defense against activists. A 
staggered board can increase costs for activists by restricting the pool of directors that they can 
target to one third of the board. In addition, an activist is required to hold onto shares for at least 
two years to make a credible threat that it would control the board, which would be costlier and 
riskier for the activist.  
While dual-class structures and staggered boards have characteristics that make activism 
more difficult, poison pills may be less effective at preventing activism. Most activists do not 
intend to take over the firm; rather they seek support from other shareholders in enacting their 
policies. Given that activists do not need to own a majority of voting rights by themselves, a poison 
pill that limits their ownership is unlikely to prevent them from gathering support from other 
shareholders. In summary, the presence of defense measures is likely to be a signal of 
undervaluation, but whether they limit the success of activism is an empirical question.  
My first empirical analysis provides evidence that having a staggered board or dual-class 
shares is associated with a lower likelihood of being targeted for activism, while having a poison 
pill is associated with a higher likelihood of being approached by activists. This result is consistent 
with the differential effectiveness of each defense measure as a deterrent against shareholder 
activism.  
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Second, I examine the types of demands that activists make to boards of target firms with 
any one of the three defense measures in place. If an activist believes that a target is undervalued 
due to the presence of defense mechanisms, the activist will likely seek to remove such defense 
mechanisms and improve corporate governance. Furthermore, if an activist believes that a 
company is an attractive takeover target, but defense measures are blocking the market for 
corporate control, the activist will also demand that the board seek a potential acquirer. I find that, 
when defense mechanisms are in place, not only do activists ask for the removal of these defenses, 
but they also make demands consistent with the failure of the market for corporate control. 
Specifically, activists demand that the target firm sell itself as a whole or in parts, often referred to 
as exploring “strategic alternatives.” This evidence is consistent with activism arising to address 
frictions in the market for corporate control associated with takeover defenses.  
 Third, I analyze whether activists succeed in repealing takeover defenses and removing 
frictions in the market for corporate control. While the previous results suggest that activists pursue 
removal of takeover defenses and sale of the target companies, it is not clear whether they are 
successful in realizing their demands. If activist campaigns are effective, we are likely to see 
removal of takeover defenses and sales of the target firms. My findings suggest that, even after 
controlling for the recent trend towards removing poison pills and staggered boards, an activism 
campaign is followed by a higher likelihood of removal of a poison pill and a staggered board 
within two years. In addition, I find an increase in the probability of takeover within two years for 
the sample of target firms, despite having a poison pill or a staggered board in place. I also find 
that financial leverage increases and capital expenditures decrease following activism, but do not 
find that the effect differs according to the existence of defense measures.  
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 Lastly, I study defensive responses to activism by target firms and their effects on activism 
outcomes.  I test how often boards adopt a poison pill in response to an activism announcement 
and how that response varies with the activist’s equity stake and demands. I focus on poison pill 
adoption because, unlike the other defenses, a poison pill can easily be adopted without 
shareholder approval when a firm is faced with the threat of activism (Coates, 2000). I find that, 
controlling for other factors, the announcement of activism increases the likelihood of poison pill 
adoption by 6.2%. I also find that a board’s decision to adopt a poison pill is positively related to 
the percentage of activist ownership, demand for board seats, and demand for sale of the target. 
However, I do not find evidence that these poison pills adopted in response to shareholder activism 
are a successful defense against activist demand. I observe that the likelihood of takeover or CEO 
turnover is no lower in cases where companies adopted a poison pill compared to ones where they 
did not.  
 This paper contributes to our understanding of defense mechanisms and their role in 
shareholder activism. There is a large stream of literature on takeover defenses that examines the 
effects of defense measures on firm performance, valuation, and the probability of takeover. There 
is also an emerging stream of research on shareholder activism that studies the determinants and 
consequences of this new phenomenon. However, these studies have neglected to consider the 
effects of defense measures on shareholder activism – and especially their effects on activist target 
selection. Brav et al. (2008) show that poor corporate governance is associated with a higher 
likelihood of being targeted for activism, but they do not examine which particular defenses matter 
most and whether the presence or absence of defense measures affects the interaction between the 
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target firms and activists. My results show that the effect of a poison pill differs from those of a 
staggered board and dual-class shares.3  
 This paper also contributes to the literature on the effect of institutional investors’ direct 
intervention on corporate governance and firm outcomes (Edmans, 2013). It provides evidence 
that shareholder activism can function to reduce friction in the market for corporate control 
associated with takeover defenses that might otherwise entrench managers and boards altogether. 
While hostile takeovers have become rare due to the availability of poison pills and other defensive 
measures, activism has become a new force in the market for corporate control. Activists target 
firms that are undervalued, in part because their management is protected by the defense measures 
in place, and attempt to promote changes in the defense measures themselves and push for sale of 
the targets. Activism thus potentially improves corporate governance of the target firm and opens 
up the possibility of improving the market for corporate control.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the prior literature on 
shareholder activism and takeover defenses. Section 3 describes the data and offers descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 examines the role of takeover defenses on activist target selection. Section 5 
examines the relation between defense measures and activist demands and outcomes. Section 6 
examines the board adoption of a poison pill in response to activism and the effectiveness of 
adopting a poison pill as a defensive strategy. Section 7 concludes the analysis.  
 
2. Prior research and institution setting 
2.1. Shareholder activism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Boyson and Pichler (2014) examine poison pill adoptions during activism, but do not examine a) the effect of having 
a poison pill on target selection or b) the two other defense measures covered in this paper.  
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 It is common these days to see headlines about companies being targeted by shareholder 
activists. Activists, mainly driven by hedge funds, buy stakes in firms that they deem undervalued 
and push for improvement in performance and governance. Gantchev (2013) describes shareholder 
activism as a sequential process. Activists initially attempt friendly negotiation with management, 
as a hostile campaign is costly. However, when they cannot reach an agreement, they can end up 
in a proxy fight, in which the activists seek board representation and pass their proposals. In such 
circumstances, it is crucial for the activists to convince other shareholders to side with them.  
 Many recent studies have examined the new phenomenon of hedge fund activism. Brav et 
al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), and Gow et al. (2014b) identify several firm characteristics that 
are associated with the likelihood of being targeted for activism. In general, smaller firms (small 
market capitalization), undervalued firms (high book-to-market), poorly performing firms (low 
growth or low returns) and firms in which leverage or dividend payout is low are associated with 
a higher likelihood of being targeted for activism (Brav et al., 2010). The present analysis 
hypothesizes that another factor affecting this likelihood is the presence of one of the three defense 
measures.  
 Prior studies have generally found positive consequences of shareholder activism. Brav et 
al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), and Gow et al. (2014) find a positive and significant stock market 
reaction to announcements of activism campaigns. Studies have also investigated reasons for these 
positive returns. Klein and Zur (2009) find that activists’ ability to transfer wealth from debtholders 
to stockholders generates positive returns as activists demand reductions in a target firm’s cash 
holdings and increases in its leverage. Bebchuk et al. (2013) also find increases in operating 
performance, such as return on assets, both in the short and long run. Greenwood and Schor (2009) 
emphasize activists’ ability to force target firms into takeovers as a source of shareholder gains. I 
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contribute to the literature by providing evidence that activists also bring changes to those firms 
with defense measures, such as the removal of the defense measures themselves and a drive 
towards more takeover activities.  
 
2.2. Takeover defenses 
 Takeover defenses have been developed to protect companies from outside pressures, 
especially hostile takeover attempts by corporate raiders. Examples of takeover defenses include 
a dual-class capital structure, a staggered board, and a poison pill.  
 
2.2.1. Dual-Class shares 
 A dual-class capital structure is a type of stock structure that involves two or more classes 
of stocks, such as Class A and B shares. These different classes of stocks have different voting 
rights; for example, the superior class might have ten votes per share, while the inferior class has 
one vote per share. The superior class with higher voting rights is owned by management or 
management-friendly investors, and is usually not publicly traded (Gompers et al., 2010). This 
structure limits the level of influence the non-management shareholders can have on the 
management or insiders. Gompers et al. (2010) find that insiders on average hold 60% of the voting 
rights compared to 40% of the cash-flow rights in dual-class firms. Even though the management 
does not actually own a majority of shares, it can still hold voting control with a majority of voting 
rights. This arrangement effectively prevents the management from losing any kind of proxy 
contest. Therefore, a corporate raider or even an activist would be reluctant to target these firms. 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ do not allow a dual-class capital structure 
to be introduced at a post-IPO stage.  
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2.2.2. Staggered Board 
 A staggered board is a type of board structure in which only a fraction (usually a third) of 
directors are elected each year. For example, if a board consists of nine directors, three directors 
would be elected for a term of three years. When a staggered board is in place, it takes at least two 
years for any hostile bidder or dissident to control the board. This structure thus effectively 
prevents a potential acquirer from taking control of the board and delays takeover attempts. 
Bebchuk et al. (2002) point out that neither a hostile bidder nor an activist has ever won two 
successive elections in a staggered board.  
 While it is not impossible, it is difficult to introduce a staggered board following a 
company’s IPO. Doing so requires shareholder approval, and it is highly likely that institutional 
investors would disapprove the proposal. ISS and Glass Lewis also oppose proposals to stagger a 
board, while they support proposals to de-stagger a board.  
 
2.2.3. Poison Pill 
 A poison pill, more formally called a shareholder rights plan, gives all current shareholders 
with the exception of a potential acquirer the right to buy an extra share at a discounted price. A 
poison pill is triggered when the potential acquirer holds more than the threshold level of stocks 
in a firm (typically 15-20%). It prevents a potential acquirer, or a corporate raider, from 
accumulating more than a threshold ownership level, since holding more than this level would 
dilute its ownership, typically by half. Historically, a poison pill has been the most powerful tool 
against any hostile takeover attempt (Catan and Kahan, 2015).  
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 A special kind of poison pill has been developed recently in response to the popularity of 
hedge fund activism– the 13D poison pill. Such a poison pill is triggered if an activist shareholder, 
who files a Schedule 13D with the SEC, gains more than 10 percent ownership, while a passive 
shareholder, who files a Schedule 13G, can hold up to 20 percent before the poison pill is 
triggered.4 The 13D pill is specifically designed to limit activists’ influence, since their maximum 
ownership is limited to 10 percent. In this paper, I examine whether these poison pills are effective 
against activists.  
 Unlike a dual-class capital structure or a staggered board structure, a poison pill requires 
minimal effort to adopt or repeal. It does not need approval from shareholders; it can be instituted 
at a board meeting. More and more firms, therefore, are repealing their poison pill and instead 
waiting until a poison pill becomes necessary to adopt one, commonly called a “shadow pill” 
(Coates, 2000).  
 
2.2.4. Takeover defenses and consequences 
 Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Bebchuk et al. (2002) find that poison pills and 
staggered boards reduce the likelihood of a takeover. These defenses can be beneficial for 
shareholders if the board has adopted them to increase its bargaining power with potential 
acquirers, which would increase the control premium received by shareholders.  
 However, they can also be harmful to shareholders if they have been adopted to personally 
benefit the board or specific managers—for example, by allowing them to retain their positions as 
top executives (Ruback, 1988). Prior research suggests that these takeover defense measures are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Under Rule 13D, an investor with ownership of stock over 5% of the company needs to file a Schedule 13D with the 
SEC. The information has to be disclosed within 10 days of the transaction. Schedule 13G, which is shorter than 
Schedule 13D, can be used if an investor’s ownership of stock is over 5% of the company, but the owner does not 
intend to actively get involved with the management.  
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indeed associated with management entrenchment and firm undervaluation. Malatesta and 
Walking (1988) and Ryangaert (1988) find negative market reactions to announcements of poison 
pills, which the authors attribute primarily to management entrenchment.5 Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005) and Cohen and Wang (2013) find lower value associated with staggered boards while 
Masulis et al. (2007) find more value-destroying acquisitions by firms with staggered boards.6 
Gompers et al. (2010) find that firm value decreases with higher voting rights held by insiders in 
dual-class firms. While existing research has mainly focused on the effect of defense measures on 
takeover activities and valuation outcomes, this paper addresses the interplay between defense 
measures and shareholder activism, which can potentially affect each other.  
 Prior research has developed measures that, using multiple takeover defense provisions, 
can comprehensively capture the quality of corporate governance. Gompers et al. (2003) created 
the shareholder rights index, called the G-Index, based on 24 provisions. Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
created a sub-index of the G-Index, called the Entrenchment Index (E-Index), focusing on (a) 
supermajority voting requirements for charters, bylaws, and mergers, (b) classified boards, (c) 
poison pills, and (d) golden parachutes. However, these indices do not capture the effects of 
individual measures on the quality of corporate governance, and there is no single “best” measure 
of corporate governance since firms’ circumstances vary (Bhagat et al., 2008). For this reason, 
Cremers and Ferrell (2014) look at the effects of individual takeover defenses in their examination 
of firm values.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Brickley et al. (1994), however, show that "the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is 
positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not.” Comment and Schwert 
(1995) also find that poison pills increase takeover premiums without decreasing takeover likelihood.  
6 On the other hand, other papers have found opposite results. Faleye (2007), for example, found higher bid premiums 
for firms with staggered boards and firms with poison pills.  
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 Brav et al. (2008) include the G-index in one of their models of activist target selection so 
as to see how a firm’s governance characteristics are associated with the likelihood of activism. 
While they find that a higher G-index (that is, lower governance quality) is associated with a higher 
likelihood of activism, the model sheds no light on which defenses matter in which direction in 
the context of shareholder activism. Instead of looking at an aggregated measure, I focus separately 
on the three specific provisions—dual-class capital structure, staggered board, and poison pill—
which are most relevant to boards and activists during an activism campaign.7  
 
2.3. Takeover defenses and shareholder activism 
 Activists investigate potential target companies and assess the probability of bringing about 
positive changes given the potential opposition from management, the board, and other investors. 
After careful assessment, they will engage in a campaign only if the expected returns outweigh the 
expected costs. Takeover defenses can have two opposing effects on this decision-making process. 
On one hand, as prior literature suggests, firms protected by takeover defenses are likely to be the 
very firms that are undervalued, and are thus more likely to be targeted by activists. If defense 
measures are a signal of entrenched management or weak governance, activists may be able to add 
value by negotiating changes such as replacing management or removing the defense mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the presence of takeover defenses can be a useful public relations tool against 
management. Proxy advisory services such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There also exist shareholder-friendly mechanisms that can help activists. The ability to call a special meeting can be 
used by activists to initiate an activism campaign at any time they want instead of waiting for a regular shareholder 
meeting, which only happens once a year. Action by written consent can be used by activists to pass some shareholder 
proposals with a certain level of shareholder consent without holding a shareholder meeting. These mechanisms enable 
an activist to bring a surprise attack against the target firm. However, because I have found their effects to be 
insignificant, I do not discuss or report their results.  
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Lewis (GL) are generally against takeover defenses, and powerful takeover defense measures such 
as poison pills are often considered harmful to shareholders. 
 On the other hand, defense measures can deter activist approaches if they reduce activists’ 
expected returns by increasing the cost and decreasing the probability of success. Activists need 
to invest resources and energy into each campaign when faced with opposition from management 
and the board (Gantchev, 2013), and if the probability of success decreases due to takeover 
defenses, their expected costs will be higher and expected return lower. Thus, just as takeover 
defense measures deter takeover attempts, they can also discourage attempts to engage in activism 
campaigns.  
 Each of the three takeover defense measures examined in this study has been effective 
against hostile takeover attempts by corporate raiders in different ways. However, despite their 
efficacy in preventing hostile takeovers, the effectiveness of the defense measures in the context 
of shareholder activism may differ. What might have been a powerful defense against corporate 
raiders may not be a strong defense against shareholder activists. With a dual-class capital 
structure, management or management-friendly shareholders often own the majority of voting 
rights. For this reason, if management or the board disagrees with an activist's thesis and plan, it 
would be practically impossible for the activist to win a proxy fight to force changes on 
management. This means that a dual-class voting structure is ex-ante likely to preclude an activist 
fund from engaging in a campaign, making it a powerful defense against shareholder activism.  
A staggered board can also be an effective defense against shareholder activism. On a 
staggered board, only one-third of the directors are replaced in each election. This means that even 
the best possible outcome—winning one-third of the seats—would not give the activists enough 
leverage to take control of the firm. Also, a staggered board makes it harder for activists to replace 
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the directors they consider the weakest or poorest-performing, since those directors may not 
happen to be up for election that year. If the most talented and best-performing directors are up for 
election, it would be much more difficult to convince other shareholders to vote for the activists’ 
candidates. It is therefore more difficult for an activist to make a credible threat to gain control of 
the board. Such a threat can itself be a powerful tool for an activist, as illustrated by Starboard’s 
campaign against Darden Restaurants. Starboard waged a proxy fight against Darden and 
successfully replaced the entire board, winning all Darden’s board seats. Had a staggered board 
been in place, Starboard would have been unable to make this change in a single year, and may 
not have even opted to initiate the campaign.  
 A poison pill, on the other hand, may not be an effective defense against shareholder 
activism. While a poison pill can limit the percentage of shares an activist can own in a target firm, 
it does not prevent an activist from winning a proxy contest. When management or the board 
disagrees with the activist's agenda, activists can convince other shareholders to side with them to 
win a proxy contest. The possibility of gaining support from other shareholders can therefore limit 
the effectiveness of a poison pill as a defense.  
Overall, while all three measures are likely to be an indicator to an activist of potential 
value to be unlocked, the effectiveness of each defense measure is likely to be differentially 
associated with the probability that activists will achieve their objectives. This situation raises the 
empirical question of how each of the takeover defenses is differentially associated with the 
likelihood of activism. I examine the following aspects of this question about activism and defense 
measures: First, the effect of each takeover defense on target selection; second, the effect of 
takeover defenses on activist demands; third, the effect of shareholder activism on a company’s 
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existing takeover defenses and takeover probabilities; and fourth, whether companies adopt a 
poison pill in response to activism and whether it can be an effective defense against activists.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Activism events 
 My data on shareholder activism come from the FactSet SharkWatch database, which 
contains information on activism events—primarily in the United States—including the types of 
demand the activists made and whether they resulted in success. I include all publicly disclosed 
activism events that started in the period of 2006–2014 in the United States. I exclude corporate 
control contests initiated by another corporation and target firms that are investment trusts or 
mutual funds; I also exclude activism consisting only of routine shareholder proposals submitted 
under Rule 14a-8. The resulting sample consists of 1,845 activism events (see Table 1), primarily 
conducted by hedge fund activists or other major shareholders (i.e., Schedule 13D filers).  
 Panel A of Table 1 presents the number of activism events by year. While there are more 
activism events during the period of financial crisis, there is a consistent stream of events 
throughout the sample period (see Figure 1). Panel B of Table 1 presents the number of activism 
events by industry. 13% of the target firms were from the business-to-business service industry 
and 8% and 7% of the targets were from the banking and electronic equipment industry, 
respectively. The proportion is consistent with the percentage of firms found in each industry for 
the population of listed firms in the United States. Panel C of Table 1 presents the number of 
activism events by state of incorporation. While the largest percentage (i.e., 62%) of target firms 
were incorporated in Delaware, this is also consistent with the percentage of firms incorporated in 
Delaware in the population.  
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3.2. Defense measures 
 My data on defense measures come from the FactSet SharkRepellent database, which 
contains information on each firm’s use of such measures as poison pills, staggered boards, and 
unequal voting structures. It also provides a detailed history of charter and bylaw changes and 
poison pill replacements and amendments.  
 Descriptive statistics on takeover defense measures by year (see Panel A of Table 2) show 
that two of the three defense measures that I focus on have been widely used: from 2006 to 2013, 
52.5% of the firms in the sample had a staggered board and 23.0% had a poison pill. In contrast, 
only 8.2% of the firms had a multi-class capital structure. Figure 2 shows a decreasing trend of 
having a staggered board or a poison pill over the sample period; while 58.1% of the firms had a 
staggered board and 32.6% had a poison pill in 2006, those percentages had dropped to 42.6% and 
15.6%, respectively, by 2013.8 Panels B and C of Table 2 look at the activism and non-activism 
samples, respectively. Univariately, we see that fewer companies in the activism sample have a 
staggered board and more companies in the activism sample have a poison pill (See Figure 2).  
 
3.3. Other variables 
 Consistent with prior literature (Brav et al., 2008; Gow et al., 2014), I control for the 
following variables when examining the relation between takeover defenses and shareholder 
activism: firm performance (Size-adj. return, Return on assets, Sales growth), firm size (Market 
value), book-to-market ratio (Book-to-market), leverage (Leverage), cash holdings (Cash), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In the meantime, a Factiva search provides anecdotal evidence for the increasing use of poison pill against activism 
campaigns. While search result numbers decrease over time for the keyword “poison pill” by itself, the combined 
results for the keywords “poison pill” and “activism” increase year by year.  
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dividend payout ratio (Dividend), the number of analysts covering the firm (Analyst), institutional 
holdings (Institutional holdings), and history of the firm (Firm age). I also control for governance 
characteristics such as the board size (Board size) and the percentage of outside directors (Outside 
directors).  
 
4. Takeover Defenses and Activist Target Selection 
4.1. Empirical analysis 
 To examine how each of the takeover defense measures in place is differentially associated 
with the probability of being targeted for activism, I estimate the following specification for all 
firm-years in my sample:  
Pr(Activism) = F(Dual-class, Staggered board, Poison pill,  
Controls, Year fixed effects, Industry fixed effects),             (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, Activism, equals one if a firm was the target of an activist campaign 
during the year, and the main variables, Dual-class, Staggered board, and Poison pill, equal one 
if a firm had each defense measure in place at the beginning of each year.  
 Panel A of Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) as a linear probability 
model, in which the sample is all firms listed on both CRSP and Compustat between 2006 and 
2014. The results are consistent when I run logistic regression models.9  The dependent variable 
measures whether an activist targeted a given firm during each fiscal year. All control variables 
are measured at the fiscal year-end of the previous year so that I control for the effects of financial 
position, operating performance, and other governance characteristics in the previous year on the 
likelihood of activism in the year of interest. The status of each takeover defense is also measured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For ease of interpretation of the regression results, I report only the results from using linear probability models. See 
Appendix Table A2 for the regression results using logistic models. 
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at the fiscal year-end of the previous year (i.e., at the beginning of the year). For example, if an 
activist filed Schedule 13D on May 12, 2012, I measure whether each takeover defense was in 
place as of December 31, 2011. Because a poison pill can be adopted without shareholder approval, 
boards can adopt one whenever there are suspicious stock-trading activities. If a board suspects 
that an activist is approaching the firm, it might preemptively adopt a poison pill, which can result 
in reverse causality; that is, adoption of a poison pill would not cause activism, but rather activism 
would cause the adoption of a poison pill. Therefore, I exclude observations in which a poison pill 
was adopted within the three months preceding the announcement of an activism event. 
 Columns (1) through (3) separately examine the effect of having a dual-class capital 
structure (Dual-class), a staggered board structure (Staggered board), and a poison pill (Poison 
pill), respectively, on the probability of being targeted for activism (Activism). The negative 
coefficients for Dual-class in Column (1) and Staggered board in Column (2) imply a decrease of 
1.3 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively, in the likelihood that a firm with those defenses will 
be targeted for activism. On the other hand, the positive coefficient for Poison pill in Column (3) 
implies an increase of 1.3 percentage points in the likelihood that a firm with a poison pill will be 
targeted for activism.  
 Column (4) includes all three defense measures in one regression in order to control for the 
effect of each takeover defense on the others. The effects are consistent with those reported in 
Columns (1) through (3). Given that about 4.5% of the sample is targeted for activism, the 
existence of defense measures is not only statistically but also economically significantly 
associated with the probability of being targeted for shareholder activism. The estimates in Column 
(4) suggest that having a dual-class capital structure or a staggered board is associated with a 30% 
decrease or a 13% decrease in the likelihood of being targeted for activism, whereas having a 
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poison pill is associated with a 30% increase in the likelihood of being targeted for activism. These 
results suggest that the three defense measures have differential effectiveness on shareholder 
activism.  
 I also test whether the effectiveness estimates of the defense mechanisms are statistically 
distinguishable from each other. The estimate for Poison pill is statistically different from that for 
Dual-class as well as from Staggered board (F-stat of 16.43 and 15.39, respectively). However, 
while a difference in the coefficients is visible (0.57) between Dual-class and Staggered board, 
they are not statistically distinguishable from each other (F-stat = 0.86, p-value = 0.35).  
 Beyond the potential ineffectiveness of the poison pill as a defense device against activists, 
plausible explanations for the attraction effect of poison pills include its signaling of managerial 
entrenchment and its usefulness as a public relations tool against management during the activism 
campaign, especially given the current trend of repealing poison pills. Most companies with poison 
pills have been rescinding and putting them on the shelf (Coates, 2000), as we have seen in Figure 
2. Unlike a dual-class structure or a staggered board, a poison pill is easily repealed, as doing so 
requires only board approval. Therefore, the presence of a poison pill is entirely dependent on the 
willingness of the board. Some boards, however, have not caught up on this trend and still retain 
poison pills from years ago. Activists are in the business of shaking up weak boards and correcting 
poor performance and/or undervaluation rooted in board and management entrenchment; a legacy 
poison pill gives a signal to activists that they might have found a good target.  
 Moreover, a poison pill can be a good public relations tool against the target firm. A poison 
pill is often portrayed as harmful to shareholders, and proxy advisory services such as Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass-Lewis (GL) generally oppose the measure, especially when 
it lasts for more than a year without shareholder approval. Therefore, the presence of a poison pill 
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can help activists convince other investors to side with them against entrenched (and presumably 
underperforming) management if it comes to a proxy fight.  
 Additionally, the recent adoption of a poison pill can signal to activists that the firm may 
recently have been or is likely to be a takeover target and that there is an opportunity to push it 
into a takeover deal. As stated above, many companies still have a poison pill “on the shelf,” which 
means that their boards can adopt it in the event of a threat. Therefore, if a board has recently 
adopted a poison pill, it probably experienced—or at least sensed—a takeover threat. I examine 
whether recently adopted poison pills are associated with the probability of activism because there 
is a high potential for future takeover attempts and management resistance to them. In Column (5) 
of Panel A of Table 3, I include an indicator for a poison pill adopted less than a year before the 
year-end. I find that the coefficient for Pill adopted < 1 year is positive and significant, suggesting 
that activists are more likely to target firms that have adopted a poison pill most recently. This, in 
turn, implies that activists might believe that other investors are interested in a takeover and 
therefore might intervene in order to seize the opportunity.10  
 The coefficients for the control variables are consistent with the results found in prior 
studies. Higher cash holdings, a higher number of analysts covering the firm, and higher 
institutional ownership are associated with a higher likelihood of activism, while higher market 
value and stock market performance are associated with a lower likelihood of activism.  
 I use a propensity score matching procedure to ensure that my results are not driven by 
significant differences between the firms with and without defense measures. Overall, the results 
in Panel B of Table 3 show once again that while a poison pill is associated with a higher likelihood 
of being targeted for activism, a staggered board is associated with a lower likelihood. In order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As discussed earlier, in order to control for a potential threat of activism, I do not include any poison pill that was 
adopted within three months prior to the activism announcement.  
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achieve better covariate balance, I impose a caliper (radius) of 0.0001 in Column (2); the 
differences in the control variables between the treatment and control samples are insignificant. 
The results are consistent, and I additionally find that a dual-class structure is also associated with 
a lower likelihood of being targeted.  
 
4.2. Cross-sectional variation: size 
 I next examine the circumstances under which takeover defenses matter in activists’ target 
selection. The importance of takeover defenses can vary depending on firm characteristics. I 
therefore use a cross-sectional test to examine the circumstances under which a given takeover 
defense would matter more in the context of target selection and in which direction.  
 I specifically investigate whether larger firms with takeover defenses are less likely than 
smaller firms with takeover defenses to be targeted for activism. An activist would have to acquire 
a large number of shares to become a threat to management. Activists hold onto shares for 2-3 
years on average (Gow et al., 2014b), as it is very costly for them to hold a large amount of shares 
in one firm for a longer time. Holding onto shares is especially costly in the case of target firms 
with staggered boards, because it generally takes a long time for activists to gain a significant 
number of board seats. It costs them even more to hold onto significant ownership of stocks when 
the target firm is large. Therefore, the larger the firm, the more powerful the defense effect of a 
staggered board and the less likely it is to become a target. Consistent with this hypothesis, Column 
(1) and Column (4) of Panel C of Table 3 show that the coefficient for the interaction between 
Market value and Staggered board is negative and significant. The coefficient for Market value is 
negative and significant, suggesting that the size of the firm is negatively associated with the 
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likelihood of activism.11 I do not, however, find significant interaction effects between Market 
value and Dual-class or Poison pill.  
 
5. Takeover defenses and activist demand and outcomes 
5.1. Activist demand 
 Having established the circumstances under which activists are likely to target companies, 
I now examine what types of demand activists are most likely to make when target firms have 
defense measures in place. In general, takeover defenses block the market for corporate control; 
firms that otherwise would be targets for takeover due to poor management performance are 
protected and the management is more likely to be entrenched. Firms with strong defense measures 
are therefore more likely than firms with weaker defense measures to receive demands to remove 
them so as to improve governance of the target and also improve its performance.  
 If takeover defenses have been blocking the function of the market for corporate control, 
activists would not only demand removal of those defenses but also directly demand the sale of 
the target. Indeed, Karpoff et al. (2015) find that staggered boards and unequal voting structures 
do deter takeovers, though they find mixed evidence for poison pills. It makes sense, then, for 
activists to demand a sale of the company, as they can then obtain their returns more quickly and 
reliably. Therefore, I predict that activists are more likely to demand that a target firm seek a 
potential acquirer if the firm has takeover defenses in place than otherwise.  
 I focus on the sample of activist target firms and examine what kinds of activist demand 
and future outcomes are associated with defense mechanisms in place prior to activism campaigns. 
The FactSet SharkWatch database provides data on the types of demand activists make for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that the positive and significant coefficients for Staggered board are due to the existence of interaction terms. 
The mean value of Market value is 2.8, so the average effect of Staggered board is still negative and significant.  
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majority of activism campaigns as well as whether those demands were successfully implemented. 
Table 4 describes the types of demand made in this sample. The most popular demand during the 
sample period is board representation (Board seat), followed by looking for opportunities to sell 
the target (Sale of target) and finding strategic alternatives12 (Strategic alternatives). The success 
rates for Board seat, Strategic alternatives, and Sale of target are 64%, 38%, and 23%, respectively. 
The rate of 23% represents a high degree of success, considering the low frequency of mergers in 
a given year.  
 Activists tailor their demands to the target firm’s problems and consider whether existing 
takeover defenses are at least one of the causes of undervaluation. Therefore, I examine how the 
three takeover defenses, when already in place, relate to the types of demand activists make. Table 
5 describes which of the demands is significantly associated with each defense measure. The 
results from estimating the reverse regression without an intercept 13 show that all three defense 
measures are significantly associated with demands for Removal of takeover defense and Strategic 
alternatives. Furthermore, Poison pill is associated with demand for Sale of target, which suggests 
that a poison pill might have been blocking the market for corporate control and that the activists 
want to remove the block. Also, Dual class is negatively associated with demand for Board Seat, 
which implies that dual-class structure is such a powerful mechanism that the activists do not think 
it would be possible to get a board seat. Overall, the results suggest that having defense 
mechanisms in place is associated with defense-related and takeover-related demands.  
 
5.2. Activism outcomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  The term “strategic alternatives” is commonly used by activists to broadly demand mergers, acquisitions or 
divestitures.  
13 I do not include an intercept so that all demands are present in the table of results.  
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5.2.1. Removal of defense measures 
 Having demanded removal of takeover defenses and sale of the target, do activists bring 
about real changes? Here I examine whether takeover defenses are more likely to be removed and 
whether the target is more likely to be taken over despite having defense measures following 
activist intervention.  
 Table 6 presents results from estimating the following equation:  
Pr(Removal of takeover defense in year t+2) = F(Activism, Controls) (2) 
where the dependent variable is an indicator for takeover defense measures in place in the two 
years following the activism event (t + 2). The sample for each analysis is a subsample of firms 
that has, respectively, a dual-class capital structure, a staggered board, and a poison pill. 
Coefficients for Activismt in Columns (1) and (2) are positive and significant, suggesting that 
activism is associated with a higher likelihood of removal of staggered boards and poison pills. 
Specifically, a staggered board is 11.3 percentage points more likely to be de-staggered and a 
poison pill is 5.5 percentage points more likely to be repealed in the following two years after a 
firm is the target of activism. In other words, shareholder activism is associated with removing the 
takeover defenses that have been documented to entrench managers and thus is associated with 
improvement in shareholder rights and bringing positive changes to corporate governance. In 
contrast, a dual-class structure seems rigid and is unlikely to change following activism campaigns.  
 
5.2.2. Takeover probabilities 
 To test whether takeover probabilities increase after shareholder activism, I estimate the 
following model:  
Pr(Sale of target by year t+2) =  
 F(Activism, Dual-class, Staggered board, Poison pill, Controls)  (3) 
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where the dependent variable is an indicator for sale of the target within two years from the year-
end. Control variables include performance variables that can affect both the probability of being 
targeted for activism and the probability of being taken over by another firm (Palepu, 1986; 
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). 
 Table 7 presents the results from estimating the model above. The coefficients for Activismt 
in Columns (2) through (5) are positive and significant, suggesting that the firms targeted by 
activists are 11.6 to 13.1 percentage points more likely to be taken over in the two years following 
activism. In order to see whether activism has incremental effects for firms with a poison pill, a 
staggered board or a dual-class capital structure, I interact Activismt with each takeover defense 
indicator, but the interaction effects are not significant. I do not provide evidence that activism has 
any incremental effect on the takeover probability of firms with these three defenses. However, 
the F-tests for the poison pill sample with activism and the staggered board sample with activism 
suggest that firms with these defense mechanisms are still more likely to be taken over in the two 
years following activism despite having the defense in place. Consistent with Greenwood and 
Schor (2009), shareholder activism plays a role in improving the market for corporate control, and 
I find that these results apply even to those firms with a poison pill and/or a staggered board. In 
contrast, I do not find evidence that activism is associated with higher likelihood of takeover when 
a dual-class structure is in place, suggesting the power of a dual-class structure as a defense 
mechanism.  
 
5.2.3. Financial policies 
 Table 8 examines changes in financial policies such as capital expenditure and leverage 
ratios. Prior literature has found that activism generally reduces agency costs as evidenced by 
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increased leverage and reduced capital expenditures (Brav et al., 2010; Klein and Zur, 2009), and 
that defense measures are associated with a higher probability of management entrenchment. If 
activists are successful at bringing about positive changes to the target firms, it is possible that the 
effects would be larger for the firms with defense mechanisms, as these firms are more likely to 
have entrenched managers with potentially more room for improvement in financial policies. 
However, it might be difficult to bring about these changes relatively quickly when there are 
defense mechanisms that protect management and the boards at the same time. Therefore, I 
examine the effect of activism on the financial policies of targeted firms and ask whether the effects 
of activism are greater or smaller depending upon existence of defense measures.  
 In Table 8, Pre-activism, Activism and Post-activism are indicators for the two years prior 
to, the year of, and the two years following the activism announcement, respectively. I divide these 
indicators into two by the existence of each defense measure.14 Dependent variables are Leverage 
and Capital expenditure, respectively, for Panels A and B. The coefficients for these indicators 
show the level of dependent variable in each period compared to the control sample (i.e. non-
activism years), and the F-test between Pre-activism and Post-activism shows the significance of 
the difference between periods before and after activist intervention. Lastly, the F-test between the 
activism sample with a takeover defense and the one without shows the difference in the effect of 
activism on the dependent variable between the activism sample with and without the defense 
measure.  
 In Panel A of Table 8, I find increases in leverage on average following activism. Leverage 
significantly increases by 2.9% for the sample with a staggered board, while target firms without 
a staggered board increase leverage by 5.1%. Similar effects are found with poison pill and dual-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For instance, Staggered board Pre-activism is an indicator for firms with a staggered board during the two years 
prior to the activism announcement. 
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class structure firms. However, the increase in leverage is not significantly different between the 
subsamples (Poison pill vs. No poison pill, Staggered board vs. No staggered board, Dual class vs. 
No dual-class) except for the poison pill case; the increase in the leverage ratio following activism 
is significantly larger for the sample with a poison pill in place than for the sample without.  
 I find similar effects with capital expenditure, except for the opposite sign. Panel B of Table 
8 reports that capital expenditure significantly decreases by 1.4% - 1.9% for each category of the 
activism sample. However, the reduction in capital expenditure is not significantly different 
between the subsamples with and without each defense measure.  
 
6. Board response to shareholder activism 
6.1. Poison pill adoption 
 In this last section, I study whether target firms without a poison pill adopt one in response 
to an activist approach. Many studies have focused on poison pills (with their more formal name 
“shareholder rights plans”) since Marty Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz invented the 
measure in 1982 in response to the wave of takeovers by corporate raiders. A poison pill makes it 
costly for a potential acquirer to own more than the threshold level that triggers the pill, which 
would typically dilute that acquirer’s ownership by half. A flip-in poison pill, in particular, is so 
powerful that no company with one in place has ever been acquired (Catan and Kahan, 2015). This 
powerful defense tool is now being adopted by boards to thwart activists. For example, when 
Daniel Loeb of Third Point approached Sotheby’s in 2013, asking for changes in strategy and 
leadership, Sotheby’s responded by adopting a poison pill, limiting activist ownership to no more 
than 10 percent.15 Here I statistically test whether such cases happen frequently.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Despite this effort, Loeb eventually gained three seats on Sotheby’s board. 
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 For a sample of firms without a poison pill in place, I test whether having an activism event 
during the year is associated with adopting a poison pill. Column (1) of Table 9 shows the positive 
and significant coefficient for Activism; controlling for other factors, firms that are targeted by 
activists are 6.2 percentage points more likely to adopt a poison pill than firms that are not.  
 Although poison pills may not be a good defense mechanism against activism, as discussed, 
there are several reasons why boards still might want to adopt one in response to activism. First, 
even though activists do not typically intend to take over the company, a board may want to rule 
out the possibility, especially when activists are capable of such actions. It is also helpful to limit 
activists’ influence through stock ownership in preparation for a potential proxy fight. Second, 
poison pills prevent multiple activists from forming a group (a method called “wolf-packing”16). 
Finally, poison pills that include derivative-based positions in the definition of the term “beneficial 
ownership” can prevent activists from using derivatives to accumulate ownership.17  
 Despite the poison pill’s success against takeovers, however, it is not clear whether this 
method can successfully defend management against activists. As discussed earlier, most 
activists are not seeking control, unlike corporate raiders. Rather, they seek to change the 
management or the strategy of the target, often by obtaining seats on the board. The threat of 
diluting ownership does not necessarily prevent activists from achieving these goals. If activists 
can convince other shareholders to vote for their director nominees or to vote against 
management in shareholder elections, then a poison pill would not matter. Also, as powerful as the 
poison pill is in deterring hostile takeovers, shareholders do not universally welcome it. Sikes et 
al. (2014) show a significant negative market reaction to poison pill adoptions related to net 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This is when a number of hedge funds with relatively small stakes in the target corporation communicate informally 
and share strategies and goals for an activism campaign (Latham and Watkins, 2014).  
17 Activists do not have to disclose their derivative positions until their physical stock ownership crosses five percent, 
whereupon they must file a Schedule 13D (Latham and Watkins, 2014).  
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operating losses (NOLs). They find that investors appreciate a poison pill only when it is truly 
adopted to protect against NOLs and not to entrench management. The same logic seems 
applicable to activism, especially because activism brings more investor scrutiny and shareholder 
attention to board and management behavior; the board would adopt a poison pill only if it believed 
it necessary to protect legitimate shareholder value.  
 Therefore, I predict that a board is more likely to adopt a poison pill when it believes that 
the benefits outweigh the costs; for example, when activists make demands related to potential 
(hostile) takeovers and when activists are thought to be a real threat to the company due to their 
large ownership.  
 In the following regression model, I focus only on the activism sample and investigate the 
circumstances under which boards adopt poison pills to thwart activists.  
Pr(Poison pill adoption) = F(Activist ownership, Activist demands, Controls) (4) 
 It does not make sense for a board to adopt a poison pill whenever activists approach the 
company. Doing so could worsen the situation if shareholders are opposed to such adoption. 
Rather, it will adopt the poison pill if it sees the activists as a real threat and believes that a poison 
pill would defend it from the threat. Column (2) of Table 9 shows that higher activist ownership 
is associated with a higher likelihood of poison pill adoption; boards see a greater threat of takeover 
and thus are more likely to consider the poison pill remedy. Activist demands to seek an acquirer 
or to remove defense measures are also positively associated with poison pill adoption. These 
demands are all directly associated with a takeover attempt and adopting a poison pill signals the 
board’s resistance. A merger-related demand by an activist is associated with a 14 percentage-
point increase in the likelihood of adopting a poison pill. Also, activist demand for executive 
turnover is associated with a 14.1 percentage-point increase in the probability of adopting a poison 
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pill. On the other hand, when activists want to block an acquisition, I find a negative association 
with the probability of adopting a poison pill.   
 
6.2. Effectiveness of poison pill adoption 
 I also examine how poison pill adoption is associated with eventual outcomes for activism 
targets. If adoption thwarted activists, there would be less likelihood of takeover, CEO turnover, 
or board seats granted to activists. However, if it were not so effective, for the reasons mentioned 
in the previous section, its relation with such outcomes would not be significant. I also investigate 
shareholder perceptions of poison pill adoptions by examining shareholder support in director 
elections. Poison pill adoption does not have to be approved by shareholders, but if they disagree 
with the board, their dissatisfaction could be reflected in director elections.  
To see if poison pill adoption is associated with changes in activism outcomes, I examine 
(1) whether a firm is less likely to be taken over, (2) whether a board seat is less likely to be granted 
or won, (3) whether CEO turnover is less likely, and (4) whether shareholder support during 
director elections is affected. The main variables of interest are Pill adopted, an indicator for a 
firm that adopted a poison pill after an activism announcement, and Pill in force, an indicator for 
a firm that already had a poison pill in place before an activism announcement. I estimate the 
following equation and the results are presented in Table 10.  
Activism outcomes = F(Pill adopted, Takeover defenses, Controls)        (5) 
Columns (3) and (5) of Table 10 suggest that poison pill adoption (Pill adopted) is 
positively associated with gaining board seats and CEO turnover. However, as reported in Table 
9, boards seem more likely to adopt a poison pill the greater the activists’ ownership and the more 
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extensive their demands. Therefore, these positive coefficients might reflect the power that 
activists have over the target firm, which leads to the adoption of poison pills.  
 Column (7) of Table 10 shows that poison pill adoption is not welcomed by other 
shareholders. Pill adopted is associated with a 3.8% decrease in the average support for directors 
up for election. In Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 10, I interact poison pill status with 
staggered board status (Staggered board × Pill adopted and Staggered board × Pill in force) and 
find that having a staggered board can weaken the effect of poison pill adoption, while poison pill 
adoption is associated with lower shareholder support for directors only if a staggered board is in 
place. This suggests that while a staggered board plays a powerful role in protecting management, 
shareholders become more sensitive to the likelihood of management entrenchment when a firm 
has both a staggered board and a poison pill in place when activists approach.  
Overall, I do not find evidence that a poison pill adopted in response to activism is an 
effective defense mechanism. This is not surprising given my prior finding that a poison pill does 
not deter activists from targeting the firm. Together these findings imply that a poison pill does 
not serve a defensive purpose.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 I have examined the interplay between takeover defense measures, which have existed for 
more than thirty years and have been at the core of the corporate governance environment, and 
shareholder activism, a new stimulus to the corporate governance environment. While one of the 
main goals of shareholder activism is to improve the corporate governance of a firm, takeover 
defense measures are important factors when choosing a target as well as important outcome 
measures to investigate.  
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 I first examine how different defense measures are associated with activist target selection 
and find that a staggered board and a dual-class structure deter activists from targeting the 
company. I argue that the deterrent effect of a staggered board comes from the fact that it not only 
makes it more difficult for activists to control the board, but prevents them from targeting poorly 
performing directors for replacement during a proxy fight. On the other hand, I find that a poison 
pill that is already in force does not deter activists, but rather attracts them. I argue that this is 
because the poison pill signals poor board engagement and entrenched management, especially in 
this era of repealing poison pills. It can also be used as a public relations tool against management 
during an activism campaign. Furthermore, if a poison pill has been recently adopted, it also signals 
a potentially better takeover opportunity.  
 I next examine the types of demand activists make and the resulting outcomes in relation 
to defense measures. When defense measures are already in place, activists are more likely to 
demand their removal and push for a takeover in the case of a poison pill. This suggests that 
activists act as an antidote to poison pills and other defense measures and make efforts to 
strengthen the market for corporate control. Do activists achieve what they wanted to achieve? The 
outcome results suggest that targets with a staggered board and a poison pill are more likely to 
remove those measures following activism and are more likely to be taken over in the two years 
following activism than non-targeted firms with the same defenses. It is unclear whether the 
removal of takeover defenses and advocating a takeover are necessarily value-maximizing for 
companies or shareholders, but activism reduces managerial control and creates new options for 
investors and management. I also report an increase in leverage ratio and a decrease in capital 
expenditure following activism, but do not find significant difference between targets with and 
without defense measures in place.  
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 In the last section, I find that the percentage of activist ownership and activist demands for 
merger- or takeover-defense-related demands are associated with a higher likelihood of poison pill 
adoption following activist engagement. However, it is not clear whether a poison pill provides a 
successful defense for such firms.  
Takeover defenses are still important and relevant factors in the era of shareholder activism 
with differential effectiveness as a defense. Overall, I contribute to the literature on the effects of 
shareholder activism on corporate governance and firm performance by providing evidence that 
activists seek to improve corporate governance and revive the market for corporate control.  
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FIGURE 1. Activism events by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Takeover defenses by year 
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TABLE 1. Shareholder activism events 
 
Panel A. Activism events by year 
 
This panel presents the number of activism events by year (Source: FactSet SharkWatch).  
 
Year Events Percent 
2006 258 14% 
2007 305 17% 
2008 252 14% 
2009 133 7% 
2010 174 9% 
2011 167 9% 
2012 205 11% 
2013 182 10% 
2014 169 9% 
Total 1,845 100% 
 
 
Panel B. Activism events by industry 
 
This panel presents the number of activism events by Fama-French 48 industry (Source: FactSet SharkWatch).  
 
Industry Events Percent 
Business Services 231 13% 
Banking 145 8% 
Electronic Equipment 121 7% 
Retail 119 6% 
Pharmaceutical Products 116 6% 
Communication 81 4% 
Computers 75 4% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 75 4% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 73 4% 
Trading 68 4% 
Medical Equipment 48 3% 
Machinery 45 2% 
Personal Services 44 2% 
Consumer Goods 42 2% 
Healthcare 39 2% 
Insurance 38 2% 
Wholesale 33 2% 
Transportation 32 2% 
Chemicals 29 2% 
Entertainment 26 1% 
Others 365 20% 
Total 1,845 100% 
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Panel C. Activism events by state 
 
This panel presents the number of activism events by state of incorporation (Source: FactSet SharkWatch).  
 
State of incorporation Events Percent 
Delaware 1144 62% 
Maryland 79 4% 
New York 50 3% 
California 45 2% 
Ohio 44 2% 
Pennsylvania 41 2% 
Indiana 40 2% 
Nevada 37 2% 
Washington 36 2% 
Minnesota 36 2% 
Florida 33 2% 
Massachusetts 28 2% 
New Jersey 25 1% 
Virginia 22 1% 
Wisconsin 19 1% 
Texas 19 1% 
Tennessee 17 1% 
Oregon 16 1% 
Georgia 15 1% 
Michigan 14 1% 
Others 85 5% 
Total 1,845 100% 
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TABLE 2. Takeover defense measures 
 
This table presents the number of firms with each takeover defense measure in place by year (source: FactSet 
SharkRepellent). The sample in Panel A contains all firm-years between 2006 and 2013. The sample in Panel B 
contains all firm-years with activism. The sample in Panel C contains all firm-years without activism.  
 
Panel A: All firm-years 
 Dual-class Staggered board Poison pill 
Year Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
2006 7.7% 258 58.2% 2,272 32.6% 1,273 
2007 7.5% 244 57.2% 2,169 28.9% 1,097 
2008 7.8% 245 56.2% 2,018 26.5% 953 
2009 7.9% 244 55.3% 1,923 23.8% 828 
2010 8.2% 254 52.4% 1,778 21.2% 720 
2011 8.6% 266 50.1% 1,666 19.6% 653 
2012 8.8% 272 46.4% 1,518 17.6% 575 
2013 9.1% 293 42.2% 1,400 15.7% 522 
Total 8.2% 2,076 52.5% 14,744 23.6% 6,621 
 
Panel B: Activism sample  
 Dual-class Staggered board Poison pill 
Year Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
2006 6.2% 13 56.3% 121 44.2% 95 
2007 5.5% 9 58.0% 98 36.1% 61 
2008 7.4% 7 53.6% 52 39.2% 38 
2009 7.6% 8 56.9% 62 24.8% 27 
2010 1.8% 2 43.8% 49 36.6% 41 
2011 8.0% 12 38.8% 57 21.1% 31 
2012 4.3% 6 40.3% 56 20.9% 29 
2013 8.5% 11 46.2% 61 19.7% 26 
Total 6.2% 68 49.6% 556 31.1% 348 
 
Panel C: Non-activism sample 
 Dual-class Staggered board Poison pill 
Year Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
2006 7.8% 245 58.3% 2,151 31.9% 1,178 
2007 7.6% 235 57.2% 2,071 28.6% 1,036 
2008 7.8% 238 56.3% 1,966 26.2% 915 
2009 7.9% 236 55.2% 1,861 23.8% 801 
2010 8.5% 252 52.7% 1,729 20.7% 679 
2011 8.7% 254 50.6% 1,609 19.6% 622 
2012 9.0% 266 46.6% 1,462 17.4% 546 
2013 9.1% 282 42.0% 1,339 15.6% 496 
Total 8.3% 2,008 52.6% 14,188 23.3% 6,273 
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 TABLE 3. Activist target selection 
 
Panel A: Baseline regressions 
 
This panel presents linear probabilities model results where the dependent variable is an indicator for being targeted 
for activism. The sample includes firm-years with and without activism. I calculate Analyst, the number of analyst 
forecasts for each firm-year, using data from I/B/E/S. I derive the proportion of the firm’s outstanding stock held by 
institutions (Institution) using data from WhaleWisdom. Data for three-month stock market performance (Size-adj. 
return) come from CRSP. The following variables come from Compustat: Market value, the logged value of market 
capitalization; Book-to-market, market capitalization divided by the book value of common equity; Leverage, the sum 
of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by the sum of long-term debt, current liabilities, and the book value 
of common equity; Payout, the ratio of the sum of dividends and repurchases to earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA); Return on assets, EBITDA divided by the lagged total assets; and Sales 
growth, sales divided by lagged sales. I count the number of years the firm has been on CRSP for Firm age. From 
BoardEx and Equilar, I obtain the following variables: Board size, the number of directors on the board, and Outside 
percent, the percentage of outside directors. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by firm. *** (**, *) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1) Activism 
(2) 
Activism 
(3) 
Activism 
(4) 
Activism 
(5) 
Activism 
Dual-class -1.336**   -1.338** -1.331** 
 (0.539)   (0.536) (0.536) 
Staggered board  -0.592*  -0.768** -0.760** 
  (0.309)  (0.309) (0.309) 
Poison pill   1.274*** 1.351*** 1.107*** 
   (0.412) (0.414) (0.425) 
Pill adopted < 1 year     3.399** 
     (1.483) 
Cash 2.007* 2.050* 2.039* 2.044* 2.024* 
 (1.069) (1.066) (1.066) (1.067) (1.063) 
Analyst 0.081** 0.083** 0.083** 0.079** 0.081** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Institutional holdings 2.516*** 2.646*** 2.451*** 2.433*** 2.442*** 
 (0.716) (0.716) (0.722) (0.718) (0.716) 
Size-adj. return -1.947*** -1.959*** -1.974*** -1.998*** -2.013*** 
 (0.623) (0.623) (0.630) (0.629) (0.631) 
Market value -1.766*** -1.854*** -1.726*** -1.713*** -1.806*** 
 (0.448) (0.445) (0.447) (0.446) (0.445) 
Book-to-market 2.088*** 2.048*** 2.046*** 2.052*** 1.927*** 
 (0.432) (0.432) (0.430) (0.430) (0.417) 
Leverage 1.609** 1.550** 1.550** 1.539** 1.534** 
 (0.627) (0.629) (0.627) (0.628) (0.624) 
Dividend -0.969 -0.934 -0.851 -0.863 -0.856 
 (0.737) (0.735) (0.735) (0.737) (0.734) 
Return on assets -0.653 -0.736 -0.681 -0.630 -0.311 
 (0.921) (0.923) (0.923) (0.921) (0.835) 
Sales growth -0.216 -0.175 -0.159 -0.167 -0.119 
 (0.428) (0.428) (0.428) (0.428) (0.413) 
Firm age 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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Board size -0.047 -0.051 -0.057 -0.040 -0.027 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.087) 
Outside directors 5.411*** 6.111*** 5.687*** 5.219*** 5.255*** 
 (1.695) (1.696) (1.693) (1.695) (1.790) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 
Num. obs. 22,295 22,295 22,295 22,295 22,295 
 
F-Test of Column (4) 
 
 F-stat P-value 
Dual-class = Poison pill 16.43 0.000*** 
Staggered board = Poison pill 15.39 0.000*** 
Dual-class  = Staggered board 0.86 0.354 
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TABLE 3. Activist target selection (continued) 
  
Panel B: Propensity score matching 
 
This panel presents results from analysis using propensity score matching. Coefficients represent the estimated effect 
on Activism, an indicator for shareholder activism during the year. One control firm was selected for each treated firm, 
using propensity scores in Column (1), while multiple control firms within a caliper of 0.0001 could be selected for 
each treatment firm via radius matching in Column (2). Propensity scores are estimated using a logistic regression in 
which the dependent variable is an indicator for takeover defenses and the independent variables are the controls 
reported in Panel A. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Activism  
(radius matching:  
caliper = 0.0001) 
 Activism 
Dual-class -0.988 -1.005* 
 (0.741) (0.565) 
Num. obs. (Treatment) 1,923 1,509 
Staggered board -0.973*** -1.045 *** 
 (0.403) (0.337) 
Num. obs. (Treatment) 10,998 10,180 
Poison pill 1.194*** 1.669*** 
 (0.498) (0.415) 
Num. obs. (Treatment) 5,443 4,918 
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TABLE 3. Activist target selection (continued) 
  
Panel C: Defense measures and size 
 
This panel presents a linear regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator for being targeted for activism. 
The sample includes firm-years with and without activism. Market value is the logged value of market capitalization. 
Other controls include the control variables reported in Panel A. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered 
by firm. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1)  Activism 
(2)  
Activism 
(3)  
Activism 
(4)  
Activism 
Dual-class -3.847   -3.348 
 (3.183)   (3.118) 
Staggered board  2.875**  2.336* 
  (1.379)  (1.370) 
Poison pill   3.886** 3.306* 
   (1.731) (1.730) 
Market value × Dual-class 0.847   0.687 
 (1.062)   (1.041) 
Market value × Staggered board  -1.221***  -1.093** 
  (0.455)  (0.452) 
Market value × Poison pill   -0.935 -0.699 
   (0.576) (0.576) 
Market value -1.932*** -1.419*** -1.563*** -1.212** 
 (0.444) (0.503) (0.469) (0.516) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 
Num. obs. 22,295 22,295 22,295 22,295 
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TABLE 4. Activist demands and success rates 
 
This table presents the types of demand activists have made for 1,354 events (source: FactSet SharkWatch). Multiple 
demands can be made for each activism event. Demand / Success reports the probability of activist demand being met 
by the boards successfully.  
 
 (1) Demand (N) 
(2) 
Demand (%) 
(3) 
Success (N) 
(4) 
Demand / Success 
Board seat 724 53% 462 64% 
Sale of target 433 32% 98 23% 
Strategic alternatives 336 25% 127 38% 
Payout 226 17% 97 43% 
Other governance 200 15% 75 38% 
Divestiture 157 12% 68 43% 
Remove defense 146 11% 44 30% 
Compensation 133 10% 25 19% 
Block sale of target 106 8% 59 56% 
Add independent director 96 7% 40 42% 
Leverage 74 5% 15 20% 
Remove director 70 5% 26 37% 
Remove officer 67 5% 27 40% 
Block acquisition 15 1% 9 60% 
Total activism events 1,354    
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TABLE 5. Defense measures and activist demands 
 
This table presents results from reverse regressions without an intercept, in which each takeover defense measure is 
regressed on types of activist demand. Dependent variables are indicators for existence of dual-class shares, staggered 
board, and poison pill, respectively, for columns (1) through (3).  
 
 (1) Dual-class 
(2) 
Staggered board 
(3) 
Poison pill 
Remove defense 0.050* 0.253*** 0.334*** 
 (0.027) (0.046) (0.043) 
Sale of target -0.000 0.057 0.132*** 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.035) 
Strategic alternatives 0.051*** 0.458*** 0.223*** 
 (0.018) (0.048) (0.044) 
Block sale of target 0.112** 0.024 -0.048 
 (0.044) (0.062) (0.045) 
Block acquisition -0.089 -0.166 -0.041 
 (0.086) (0.135) (0.124) 
Divestiture -0.011 -0.020 0.063 
 (0.020) (0.046) (0.042) 
Board seat -0.041*** -0.010 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.025) 
Payout 0.011 -0.027 -0.034 
 (0.021) (0.041) (0.032) 
Leverage -0.005 0.059 -0.001 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.051) 
Remove director 0.060 -0.044 -0.040 
 (0.042) (0.072) (0.059) 
Add independent director 0.020 -0.045 0.071 
 (0.030) (0.054) (0.049) 
Remove officer -0.029 -0.057 0.028 
 (0.028) (0.069) (0.060) 
Compensation -0.025 0.059 0.049 
 (0.022) (0.053) (0.044) 
Other governance 0.025 -0.047 -0.032 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.035) 
Adj. R2 0.081 0.476 0.352 
Num. obs. 1,166 1,163 1,354 
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TABLE 6. Probability of removing defense measures 
 
This table examines the likelihood of rescinding each of the three takeover defenses. The sample consists of firms 
with dual-class shares, a staggered board, and a poison pill in year t for columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The 
dependent variables are indicators for the particular takeover defense in place as of year t + 2. Controls include the 
control variables reported in Panel A of Table 3. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by firm. *** (**, *) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 
(1) 
Dual-class  
removalt+2 
(2) 
Staggered board  
removalt+2 
(3) 
Poison pill  
removalt+2 
Activism 0.042 0.113*** 0.055* 
 (0.043) (0.024) (0.033) 
Sample Dual-classt Staggered boardt Poison pillt 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.026 0.062 0.047 
Num. obs. 1,572 10,436 4,963 
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TABLE 7. Probability of sale of the target 
 
This table examines the likelihood of being taken over for firms with each of the three takeover defenses in place. 
Controls include the control variables reported in Panel A of Table 3. Values in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered by firm. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1) Takeover(t, t+2) 
(2) 
Takeover(t, t+2) 
(3) 
Takeover(t, t+2) 
(4) 
Takeover(t, t+2) 
(5) 
Takeover(t, t+2) 
Dual-class -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Staggered board -0.010** -0.010** -0.008* -0.010** -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Poison pill -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pill adopted < 1 year 0.062*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Activism  0.119*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.131*** 
  (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) 
Activism 
× Dual-class 
 -0.021   -0.025 
 (0.049)   (0.050) 
Activism 
× Staggered board 
  -0.029  -0.032 
  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Activism 
× Poison pill 
   0.005 -0.002 
   (0.029) (0.030) 
Activism 
× Pill adopted < 1 year 
    0.109 
    (0.087) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
Num. obs. 22,338 22,338 22,338 22,338 22,338 
 
 
F-Test of Column (5) 
 
 F-stat P-value 
Activism + Dual-class + (Activism × Dual-class) 2.35 0.126 
Activism + Staggered board + (Activism × Staggered board) 16.73 0.000*** 
Activism + Poison pill + (Activism × Poison pill) 17.42 0.000*** 
 
 50	  
Table 8. Activism consequences by defense measure 
 
Panel A: Leverage 
 
This panel examines changes in leverage ratio at target firms. Pre-activism, Activism and Post-activism are indicators 
for the two years prior to, the year of, and the two years following activism announcement, respectively. I divide these 
indicators into two by the existence of each defense measure. F-tests (A) and (B) examine whether differences in 
coefficients between Pre-activism and Post-activism are statistically significant for each subsample with or without a 
takeover defense. F-test (C) examines whether there is difference in the effect of activism on the dependent variable 
between the activism sample with and without a defense measure. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered 
by firm. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1) Leverage 
 (2) 
Leverage 
   (3) 
Leverage 
Dual class 
Pre-activism 0.105* 
Staggered board 
Pre-activism 0.004 
  Poison pill 
Pre-activism -0.002 
 (0.058)  (0.015)    (0.017) 
Dual class 
Activism 0.077* 
Staggered board 
Activism 0.017 
  Poison pill 
Activism 0.041** 
 (0.046)  (0.015)    (0.019) 
Dual class 
Post-activism 0.152** 
Staggered board 
Post-activism 0.033* 
  Poison pill 
Post-activism 0.084*** 
 (0.064)  (0.017)    (0.020) 
Non-dual class 
Pre-activism -0.005 
Non-staggered board  
Pre-activism 0.000 
  No poison pill  
Pre-activism 0.003 
 (0.010)  (0.014)    (0.013) 
Non-dual class 
Activism 0.019* 
Non-staggered board 
Activism 0.029** 
  No poison pill 
Activism 0.014 
 (0.010)  (0.013)    (0.012) 
Non-dual class 
Post-activism 0.037*** 
Non-staggered board 
Post-activism 0.051*** 
  No poison pill  
Post-activism 0.019 
 (0.012)  (0.015)    (0.014) 
Market value 0.027*** Market value 0.027***   Market value 0.027*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.005) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Industry fixed effects Yes   Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Year fixed effects Yes   Year fixed effects Yes 
Adj. R2 0.199 Adj. R2 0.198   Adj. R2 0.199 
Num. obs. 22961 Num. obs. 22961   Num. obs. 22961 
     
 
 
 
 
 ∆Coeff. 
(P-value) 
 ∆Coeff. 
(P-value) 
   ∆Coeff. 
(P-value) 
(A) Dual class 0.047 (A) Staggered board 0.029*   (A) Poison pill 0.086*** 
Post – Pre (0.352) Post – Pre (0.094)   Post – Pre (0.000) 
(B) Non-dual class 0.042*** (B) Non-staggered board 0.051***   (B)No poison pill 0.022 
Post – Pre (0.001) Post – Pre (0.002)   Post – Pre (0.265) 
(C) Dual class 
vs. Non-dual class 0.005 
(C) Staggered  
vs. Non-staggered -0.022 
  (C) Poison  
vs. No poison pill 0.064** 
Post – Pre (0.918) Post – Pre (0.367)   Post – Pre (0.011) 
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Table 8. Activism consequences by defense mechanisms (continued) 
 
Panel B: Capital expenditure 
 
This panel examines changes in capital expenditure at target firms. Pre-activism, Activism and Post-activism are 
indicators for the two years prior to, the year of, and the two years following activism announcement, respectively. I 
divide these indicators into two by the existence of each defense measure. F-tests (A) and (B) examine whether 
differences in coefficients between Pre-activism and Post-activism are statistically significant for each subsample with 
or without a takeover defense. F-test (C) examines whether there is difference in the effect of activism on the dependent 
variable between the activism sample with and without a defense measure. Values in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered by firm. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1) Capex 
 (2) 
Capex 
   (3) 
Capex 
Dual class 
Pre-activism -0.004 
Staggered board 
Pre-activism 0.005   
Poison pill 
Pre-activism 0.001 
 (0.010)  (0.004)    (0.005) 
Dual class 
Activism -0.007 
Staggered board 
Activism -0.004   
Poison pill 
Activism -0.005 
 (0.011)  (0.004)    (0.005) 
Dual class 
Post-activism -0.022** 
Staggered board 
Post-activism -0.010**   
Poison pill 
Post-activism -0.013** 
 (0.010)  (0.005)    (0.005) 
Non-dual class 
Pre-activism 0.006* 
Non-staggered board  
Pre-activism 0.006   
No poison pill  
Pre-activism 0.008** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.004) 
Non-dual class 
Activism -0.003 
Non-staggered board 
Activism -0.003   
No poison pill 
Activism -0.003 
 (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.003) 
Non-dual class 
Post-activism -0.011*** 
Non-staggered board 
Post-activism -0.013***   
No poison pill  
Post-activism -0.011*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.004) 
Market value -0.018*** Market value -0.018***   Market value -0.018*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Industry fixed effects Yes   Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Year fixed effects Yes   Year fixed effects Yes 
Adj. R2 0.425 Adj. R2 0.425   Adj. R2 0.425 
Num. obs. 23078 Num. obs. 23078   Num. obs. 23078 
     
  
 ∆Coeff. 
(P-value) 
 ∆Coeff. 
(P-value) 
   ∆Coeff. 
(P-value) 
(A) Dual class -0.018** (A) Staggered board -0.015***   (A) Poison pill -0.014* 
Post – Pre (0.016) Post – Pre (0.010)   Post – Pre (0.051) 
(B) Non-dual class -0.017*** (B) Non-staggered board -0.019***   (B)No poison pill -0.019*** 
Post – Pre (0.000) Post – Pre (0.000)   Post – Pre (0.000) 
(C) Dual class 
vs. Non-dual class -0.001 
(C) Staggered  
vs. Non-staggered 0.004 
  (C) Poison  
vs. No poison pill 0.005 
Post – Pre (0.906) Post – Pre (0.644)   Post – Pre (0.587) 
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TABLE 9. Probability of poison pill adoption 
 
This table presents results from regression analyses in which the dependent variable is an indicator for adoption of a 
poison pill. Column (1) looks at all firm-years; Column (2) looks at the activism sample. Controls include the control 
variables reported in Panel A of Table 3. Values in parentheses are standard errors clustered by firm in Column (1). 
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 
(1) 
Adoption of poison pill 
(2) 
Adoption of poison pill 
(activism sample) 
Activism 0.062***  
 (0.009)  
Dual-class -0.004* -0.070** 
 (0.002) (0.035) 
Staggered board 0.000 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.022) 
Activist ownership  0.006*** 
  (0.002) 
Merger-related demand  0.140*** 
  (0.028) 
Block-merger-related demand  0.046 
  (0.035) 
Block-acquisition-related demand  -0.111* 
  (0.059) 
Demand for divestiture   -0.014 
  (0.033) 
Demand for board seat   0.046** 
  (0.023) 
Demand to remove director   0.080 
  (0.063) 
Demand to remove officer   0.141** 
  (0.071) 
Demand to remove defense   0.221*** 
  (0.060) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.020 0.232 
Num. obs. 20,035 611 
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TABLE 10. Poison pill adoption and activism consequences 
 
This table presents results from regression analyses in which the sample consists of activism targets and the dependent 
variables are Sale of the target, an indicator for takeover within two years of activism, Board seat granted, an indicator 
for any board seat granted to activists, CEO turnover, an indicator for CEO turnover within two years of activism, and 
Average votes (%), an average percentage of shareholder votes for directors in director elections. Controls include the 
control variables reported in Panel A of Table 3. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1) 
Sale of 
the target 
(2) 
Sale of 
the target 
(3) 
Board 
seat 
granted 
(4) 
Board 
seat 
granted 
(5) 
CEO 
turnover 
(t, t+2) 
(6) 
CEO 
turnover 
(t, t+2) 
(7) 
Average 
votes (%) 
(8) 
Average 
votes (%) 
Dual-class -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.083* -0.083* -0.083 -0.097* 0.025 0.026 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057) (0.057) (0.021) (0.021) 
Staggered board -0.045* -0.075** -0.028 0.000 -0.003 -0.020 -0.028*** -0.030** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031) (0.040) (0.053) (0.010) (0.012) 
Pill adopted -0.012 -0.033 0.204*** 0.323*** 0.223** 0.304** -0.038** -0.003 
 (0.044) (0.061) (0.054) (0.071) (0.097) (0.117) (0.018) (0.020) 
Pill in force -0.030 -0.054 0.104*** 0.090** 0.002 -0.072 -0.035*** -0.050*** 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) (0.039) (0.052) (0.070) (0.012) (0.015) 
Pill in force < 1 year 0.095*  -0.142***  -0.135  -0.010  
 (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.082)  (0.024)  
Staggered board 
× Pill adopted 
 0.048  -0.274**  -0.240  -0.067* 
 (0.088)  (0.107)  (0.200)  (0.036) 
Staggered board 
× Pill in force 
 0.084*  -0.026  0.077  0.024 
 (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.100)  (0.022) 
Proxy fight       -0.042** -0.042** 
       (0.019) (0.019) 
Activist ownership       -0.022 -0.044 
       (0.107) (0.104) 
Proxy fight 
× Activist ownership 
      0.132 0.116 
      (0.197) (0.195) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.078 0.077 0.070 0.070 0.297 0.295 0.091 0.095 
Num. obs. 1,307 1,307 1,362 1,362 390 390 840 840 
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TABLE A1. Descriptive statistics by sample 
 
This table presents the mean value of cash, analyst, institutional holdings, size-adjusted returns, market value, book-
to-market ratio, leverage, dividend, return on assets, sales growth, firm age, board size, and percentage of outside 
directors for firms by the status of activism events and by existence of takeover defense measures (staggered board, 
poison pill, and dual-class structure).  
 
 (1) Activism 
(2) 
Dual-class 
(3) 
Staggered board 
(4) 
Poison pill 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cash 0.195 0.203 0.199 0.157 0.186 0.205 0.190 0.213 
Analyst 7.192 7.100 7.176 7.308 7.737 6.623 7.407 6.510 
Institutional holdings 0.621 0.648 0.626 0.590 0.628 0.617 0.619 0.634 
Size-adj. return 0.007 -0.042 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.005 
Market value 2.873 2.755 2.859 2.964 2.948 2.786 2.903 2.758 
Book-to-market 0.610 0.695 0.614 0.607 0.613 0.615 0.613 0.617 
Leverage 0.330 0.337 0.326 0.383 0.338 0.323 0.333 0.323 
Dividend 0.104 0.081 0.102 0.110 0.108 0.099 0.112 0.076 
Return on assets 0.094 0.088 0.089 0.136 0.103 0.083 0.098 0.077 
Sales growth 1.131 1.111 1.132 1.101 1.117 1.143 1.132 1.124 
Firm age 19.079 20.394 19.277 17.660 21.574 16.636 18.887 19.916 
Board size 8.676 8.456 8.644 8.902 8.716 8.615 8.732 8.463 
Outside percent 0.826 0.835 0.830 0.783 0.824 0.828 0.824 0.833 
Num. obs. 21,299 996 20,372 1923 11,297 10998 16,852 5443 
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TABLE A2. Activist target selection - Logistic model 
  
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is an indicator for being targeted for 
activism. The sample includes firm-years with and without activism. Values in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered by firm. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 (1) Activism 
(2) 
Activism 
(3) 
Activism 
(4) 
Activism 
(5) 
Activism 
Dual-class -0.359**   -0.353** -0.348** 
 (0.165)   (0.164) (0.164) 
Staggered board  -0.144*  -0.181** -0.179** 
  (0.074)  (0.074) (0.074) 
Poison pill   0.268*** 0.284*** 0.237*** 
   (0.085) (0.085) (0.089) 
Pill adopted < 1 year     0.516*** 
     (0.194) 
Cash 0.444* 0.462* 0.457* 0.453* 0.455* 
 (0.240) (0.238) (0.240) (0.240) (0.239) 
Analyst 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Institutional holdings 0.653*** 0.681*** 0.642*** 0.638*** 0.644*** 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.185) 
Size-adj. return -0.747*** -0.750*** -0.760*** -0.762*** -0.756*** 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
Market value -0.435*** -0.456*** -0.423*** -0.424*** -0.425*** 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) 
Book-to-market 0.369*** 0.361*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Leverage 0.341** 0.321** 0.321** 0.320** 0.318** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) 
Dividend -0.303 -0.302 -0.284 -0.285 -0.284 
 (0.234) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) 
Return on assets -0.051 -0.068 -0.058 -0.039 -0.028 
 (0.219) (0.219) (0.221) (0.220) (0.219) 
Sales growth -0.054 -0.043 -0.042 -0.043 -0.043 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) 
Firm age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board size -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Outside directors 1.295*** 1.480*** 1.396*** 1.238*** 1.238*** 
 (0.468) (0.465) (0.466) (0.467) (0.467) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.050 
Num. obs. 22,069 22,069 22,069 22,069 22,069 
 
